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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has Jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue Number 1: Are Masseys' tax deed titles superior to Defendants' titles which 
are based upon by conveyances dated and recorded subsequent to the date of the 
conveyance and recording of Masseys' tax deeds, where the grantors of Defendants' 
subsequent conveyances, and the grantors' predecessors, had been in possession of the 
property conveyed, and paid all taxes assessed against their legal descriptions, for more 
than 20 years? 
Standard of Review for Issue Number 1: The District Court decided 
this issue in favor of the Defendants' subsequent conveyances and against the Masseys by 
granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment. This Court reviews the trial 
court's summary judgment rulings for correctness, granting no deference, and viewing the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Alder v. Bayer Corp., 61 P. 3d 1068, 1076 (Utah 2002). 
Issue Number 2: Are the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" and 
resulting "Order Quieting Title to Real Property in 12 X 12 L.L.C. and Aaron Buttars and 
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Brenda L. Buttars" supported by the pleadings and supporting documents submitted in the 
trial court's summary judgment proceedings. 
Standard of Review for Issue Number 2: This Court reviews the trial 
court's summary judgment rulings for correctness, granting no deference, and viewing the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Alder v. Bayer Corp., 61 P.3d 1068, 1076 (Utah 2002). 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules nor regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of this appeal or of such central importantance as to 
require their inclusion here. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to quiet title and for trespass and waste to real property commenced 
by H. C. Massey and Betty P. Massey, Appellants (Masseys) in the District Court. 
Masseys' First Amended Complaint also alleged a cause of action for adverse possession; 
the adverse possession cause was dismissed and is not at issue in this appeal. Masseys' 
claim of title is based upon conveyances by tax deeds from Weber County. 
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment supported by memoranda 
containing lengthy statements of undisputed fact purportedly supported by lengthy exhibits 
including affidavits. R. at 601-83, 785-96 and 852-50. Masseys duly disputed many of the 
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facts propounded by Defendants. R. at 815-851. Masseys believe that the facts set forth 
herein fairly states those facts which are not in dispute. 
The motions were submitted without oral argument and the Court entered its 
"Ruling Conditionally Denying Summary Judgment." R. at 962-67. At a subsequent 
telephonic hearing between the Court and counsel and based upon certain concessions of 
fact made by Masseys' attorney the Court verbally granted the Defendants' motions for 
summary judgment and directed counsel for Defendants to prepare appropriate findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and a final order. R. at 1014. The final findings of fact and 
conclusions of law prepared by Defendants counsel incorporated by reference the Courts 
earlier conditional ruling. R. at 984-99. Copies of the trial court's initial ruling, the 
transcript of the subsequent telephonic hearing, and the findings, conclusions and final 
order are included in the Addendum hereto. 
Several of the findings of fact recited contain facts duly disputed by Masseys and 
others have no basis in the record whatsoever. These discrepancies are set out more fully 
below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves real property located in the Southeast Quarter of Section 24, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West in Weber County, Utah. Masseys purchased four 
separate parcels located in the Southeast Quarter at tax sale. Two of the parcels were 
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conveyed to the Masseys by tax deeds dated June 12, 1986, and recorded June 13, 1986. 
R. at 989-90. The other two parcels were conveyed to the Masseys by tax deeds dated on 
June 8, 1992, and recorded June 10, 1992. R. at 990-91. The four parcels were 
contiguous. R. at 839. 
No facts have been alleged evidencing any irregularity in the tax sales process. 
However, the trial court apparently agreed with the Defendants' argument that an 
irregularity can be presumed from the other undisputed facts set forth here. 
The Defendants, Kenneth A. Griffiths (Griffiths), BKB LLC (BKB) and 12X12 , 
L.L.C. (12X12) are each successors in interest to a parcel of real property (the Griffiths 
Property) also located in the Southeast Quarter of Section 24. R. at 604-05. The Griffiths 
Property was first conveyed to Griffiths by warranty deed dated after the recording of all 
of the tax deeds, on September 10, 1993, and recorded on September 23, 1993. R. at 643-
44. Griffiths conveyed the Griffiths Property to BKB by warranty deed dated and 
recorded January 24, 1994. BKB conveyed the Griffiths Property to 12X12 by Quit 
Claim Deed dated October 26, 2000, and recorded November 1, 2000. R. at 987. 
The Defendants Aaron B. Buttars and Brenda L. Buttars (collectively, Buttars) 
claim an interest in a parcel (the Buttars Property) also located in the Southeast Quarter of 
Section 24. The Buttars Property was conveyed to Buttars by Brenda's mother, 
Defendant Adele B. Lewis (Lewis), by Warranty Deed dated and recorded December 5, 
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1994. R. at 988-89. Lewis accordingly has sold all of her right, title and interest in the 
Buttars Property although she continues to reside on a portion of the parcel. 
The 12X12 Property is located North of the Buttars Property. R. at 839. A "very 
old fence" serves as the occupation line between the 12X12 Property and the Buttars 
Property. R. at 818. The legal description of Masseys' tax deed properties straddles the 
old fence and overlaps the historical occupation of the 12X12 Property and the Buttars' 
Property. R. at 819. The Defendants and their predecessors have paid taxes on legal 
descriptions contained in the tax notices issued to them by the County. R. at 1014, p. 10. 
Not material to the present issues is the fact that Defendant Questar Gas Company 
(Questar) occupied a small parcel of property along the easterly end of the old fence line 
between the parcels occupied by the other Defendants' predecessors. R. at 839. Questar is 
not a party to this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The summary judgment movants bear the burden of persuading the court that they 
are entitled to summary judgment. They have wholly failed in meeting this burden. 
Defendants' primary arguments which were apparently accepted by the trial court as 
controlling are referred to herein as the caveat emptor argument and the due process 
argument. The caveat emptor argument maintains that purchasers at tax sales purchase 
without warranties of any kind; that they purchase subject to prior recorded interests; that 
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they are chargeable with notice of and take subject to the full record chain of title; and 
that they take subject to all of the infirmities of title and subject to the doctrine of caveat 
emptor. These arguments are contrary to established Utah statutory and case law. In fact 
Utah law favors tax deed titles and recognizes that tax deed holders take a new and 
complete title under an independent grant from the sovereign authority which bars or 
extinguishes all prior titles and encumbrances of private persons and all equities arising 
out of them. When Defendants took title, Masseys' tax titles were of record and 
Defendants took title subject to Masseys' interests. 
The due process argument fails because it does not recognize the fact that 
Defendants were on notice of Masseys' interests by reason of the prior recording of 
Masseys' tax deeds. The Defendants are asserting the deprivation of their predecessors 
constitutional rights, not their own. Utah law recognizes that no one has standing to 
assert a third-parties constitutional rights under the facts of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Summary Judgment Movants Bear the Burden of Persuading the 
Court that Defendants are Entitled to Summary Judgment. 
Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most 
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favorable to the nonmoving party. Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. DisL, 2002 UT 64, Tf 2, 52 
P.3d 1230, 1233 (Utah 1993). For a moving party to be entitled to summary judgment, it 
must establish a right to judgment based on the applicable law as applied to the 
undisputed facts. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie 
Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990). "On summary judgment, the movant 
bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for its motion and 
identifying the portions of the pleadings or supporting documents that the movant 
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Harper v. Summit 
County, 963 P.2d 768, 774 (Utah App. 1998). "Supporting and opposing Affidavits shall 
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the Affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein." Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (e). 
Defendants have wholly failed in meeting their burden as will be more fully 
demonstrated below. 
II. The "Caveat Emptor" Argument is Contrary to Utah Law. 
In their caveat emptor argument Defendants argued that purchasers at tax sales 
purchase without warranties of any kind; that they purchase subject to prior recorded 
interests; that they are chargeable with notice of and take subject to the full record chain 
of title; and that they take title subject to all of the infirmities of record and subject to the 
7 
doctrine of caveat emptor. These arguments must fail as they are contrary to established 
Utah statutory and case law. 
The critical importance of the revenue collection function of government demands 
that tax titles be highly favored: 
The first and paramount necessity for social order, personal liberty, and private 
property is the maintenance of civil government; and government cannot exist 
without revenues. The necessity and importance of preferring the lien for general 
taxes over other claims are so impelling that the priority of the sovereign claims of 
the state will not be depreciated or denied without warrant from the Legislature in 
clear and unmistakable terms . . . . 
Robinson v. Hanson, 282 P. 782, 784 (Utah 1929). 
To further enhance the tax collection function, tax titles are considered new grants 
from the sovereign authority extinguishing all prior titles: 
When the period of redemption has expired and the county has received a tax deed 
for any real estate sold for delinquent taxes, the county tax lien merges into the title 
as effectively as by execution sale with such further rights of redemption as the 
statute provides. Purchasers from the county then take with a "new and complete 
title in the land, under an independent grant from the sovereign authority, which bars 
or extinguishes all prior titles and encumbrances of private persons, and all equities 
arising out of them ...." 
Hanson v. Burris, 46 P.2d 400, 406 (Utah 1935) (citations omitted). 
In 1951 the Utah Legislature enacted a special statute of limitations 
applicable to tax titles in order to give increased stability to tax titles and thereby 
augment the revenues of state and local governments. Fredriksen v. LaFleur, 632 P. 
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2d 827, 828 (Utah 1981). See also, Dillman v. Foster, 656 P. 2d 974 (Utah 1982). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently reemphasized that tax sales extinguish all prior 
claims and tax titles are entitled to a high degree of protection. In A.C Financial, Inc. v. 
Salt Lake County, 948 P.2d 771 (Utah 1997), the court was faced with the issue of whether 
liens on real property for personal and real property taxes are subject to a trust deed 
interest created before accrual of the taxes underlying the liens. The trust deed lien holder 
asked the Court to overrule the Court's earlier decision in Union Central Life Insurance 
Co. v. Black, 67 Utah 268, 247 P. 486, ( Utah 1926) (holding that tax liens enjoy priority 
over previously created contractual liens). In reaffirming Black, the Court gives heavy 
emphasis to the policy that the tax collection function of government requires that tax liens 
and tax titles be given high priority: 
In addition, the holding of Black is more closely integrated into Utah law than is 
immediately apparent. Because Black involved not only liens for personal property 
taxes on real property, but also the liens for the real property taxes owed on the 
same parcel, it also brought into Utah law the widely accepted rule that real 
property tax liens have priority over all other claims on the property taxed. Black is 
the earliest Utah case for that rule, but later cases recognize the rule (although they 
do not cite Black for it) in holding that a tax sale extinguishes all prior private 
claims on the property. See Hanson v. Burris, 86 Utah 424, 438-39, 46 P.2d 400, 
406 (1935) (acknowledging that purchasers of tax deed receive new title under 
independent grant of title which extinguishes all previous private titles and 
encumbrances); see also Buchanan v. Hansen, 820 P.2d 908, 910 (Utah 1991) 
(mentioning same); Tufty. Federal Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300, 1303 (Utah 1982) 
(citing rule in Hansen). The statute providing for tax sales implicitly recognizes 
this rule and the underlying holding of Black with regard to real property taxes by 
defining the title granted at a tax sale as a "fee simple" title — i.e., one 
unencumbered by other claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-135l.l(9)(a) (1996). 
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Not recognizing tax lien priority in the context of tax sales would significantly 
dilute the State's ability to dispose of property at such sales because the buyer 
would be subject to other claims on the property. 
A.C. Financial Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 948 P.2d 771, 776 (Utah 1997). 
The Defendants contended and the trial court adopted the argument that Masseys 
have the burden of proving that unless Weber County had a proper legal basis to issue 
their tax deeds, the deeds are void ab initio. R. at 855 and 965. These arguments and the 
courts ruling ignores the fact that Utah law favors tax deed titles and that tax deed holders 
take a new and complete title under an independent grant from the sovereign authority. It 
also flies in the face of the statutory presumption of regularity afforded tax deed holders. 
Utah Code sec. 59-2-1362. 
Established Utah law favors tax deed titles. Neither Defendants nor the Court 
below gave any shrift to this doctrine. 
III. The "Due Process" Argument is ill founded. 
Defendants argued below that should Masseys' Tax Deed titles be held superior to 
theirs, they will have been deprived of their property by due process of law. The trial 
court apparently adopted this argument although it never addressed it directly. R. at 962-
67 and 984-99. 
The Defendants' reasoning fails to recognize the fact that all of their present 
interests were acquired after the Tax Deeds were of record. The last of the Tax Deeds 
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was recorded June 8, 1992. All of the Defendants acquired their interests subsequent to 
that date. The Defendants therefore had constructive notice of Masseys' tax title and took 
subject thereto. See section 57-3-2 (1) Utah Code ("Each document executed, 
acknowledged, and certified, in the manner prescribed by this title . . . shall from the time 
of recording with the appropriate County Recorder, impart notice to all persons of their 
contents."). In other words, Defendants are asserting the deprivation of their 
predecessors' constitutional rights, not their own rights. 
The Tenth Circuit was faced with this very issue in the case of Kemmerer Coal Co. 
v. Brigham Young University, 723 F.2d 54 10th Cir. (1983). The Court stated its holding 
as follows: 
Kemmerer contends that due process was violated based on the following 
undisputed facts. Its predecessor, San Rafael, received no notice of the tax 
assessment on the coal and received only publication notice of the resultant sale of 
the coal rights . . . . These factors arguably indicate that the county deprived San 
Rafael of due process by its slipshod procedure . . . . Kemmerer itself has suffered 
no due process injury. If a constitutional violation occurred, it was the taking of 
San Rafael's property without due process. Kemmerer thus seeks to advance its 
claim by asserting a third-party's constitutional rights. "The general rule is that 'a 
litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or immunities . . . . " ' This 
rule has been applied to bar a grantee's assertion that its grantor's due process 
rights were violated . . . . We believe the Utah Supreme Court would hold that 
Kemmerer has no standing to assert a third-party's constitutional rights under the 
facts of this case . . . . [W]e do not believe it fundamentally unfair to apply the 
statute of limitations to Kemmerer who bought the coal lands in the face of record 
notice of a rival claim to "underground rights." 
Id. at 57-58 (citations omitted). 
11 
The Utah Supreme Court has agreed with the Tenth Circuit: 
The Tenth Circuit made an accurate forecast.... When Shelledy purchased the 
property from SBA in 1988, he was on record notice of defendants' rival claim to 
the property by virtue of the 1984 tax deed. Therefore, we hold that Shelledy lacks 
standing to assert the SBA's constitutional rights and defense. 
Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786, 790 (Utah 1992). 
Defendants were all on notice of Masseys' tax title at the time they took title to the 
property and are in no position to complain that Masseys' title trumps theirs. 
IV. The Trial Courts Findings of Fact are inappropriate and 
not supported by the record. 
This case points out the confusion introduced by the entry of findings of fact in 
summary judgment proceedings. The entry of findings of fact is "clearly inappropriate in 
any grant of summary judgment." Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trapper s,lnc, 925 
P.2d.941,n.3 (Utah 1996). 
In any event, many of the findings are not supported by the record: 
A. For some inexplicable reason new descriptions have been introduced into 
the findings of fact for the Griffiths Property. Compare Finding No. 1 (R. at 986 and 987) 
with the quit claim deed from BKB to 12X12. R. at 620. The descriptions are similar, 
but several of the distance calls have been changed. Masseys are aware of nothing in the 
record to support these differences. 
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B. Finding Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 7 each contain the exact wording of a legal 
conclusion regarding the subject of the paragraph: "owner and holder of the record, legal 
and equitable title". R. at 986-989. In each case this is the ultimate legal issue and is not 
appropriately stated as a finding of the Court. 
C. Finding Nos. 4 and 8 state that the Defendants "have timely paid and 
discharged all Real Property taxes that have been levied upon [their Property] during and 
throughout a period of more than twenty years immediately preceding the initiation of the 
above entitled action." R. at 987-89. Masseys have disputed these assertions. R. at 817 
and 826. What Massey did concede was that the Defendants and their predecessors paid 
taxes on the descriptions contained in the tax notices that were issued to them by the 
County. R. at 1014, p. 10. 
D. Finding No. 14, so far as can be determined by Masseys, is totally without 
support in the record. 
E. The facts contained in Finding No. 15 were disputed by the Masseys. R. at 
818-819, par. 7. 
F. Finding No. 16 restates a fact proposed by Defendants, but fully disputed by 
Masseys. R. at 821-822, par. 11. 
G. Finding Nos. 17 and 18 contain facts disputed by the Masseys. Masseys 
conceded that none of the legal descriptions set forth in their tax deeds covered any real 
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property that the Defendants and their predecessors in interest have not possessed and 
occupied, but they did dispute that the tax notices on which the taxes have been paid 
described all of the tax deed property. R. at 1014, p. 10. 
The trial court's findings are not supported by the record. It follows that the legal 
conclusions and order based on the findings must also fail. See Forbush v. Forbush, 578 
P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1978) (the findings must be sufficient to provide a sound foundation 
for the judgment). 
CONCLUSION 
To assure the governments ability to raise revenue by levying and collecting taxes on real 
property Utah law strongly favors the stability and priority of tax titles. Indeed a tax title is a 
new title issued by the sovereign. The Defendants in this case, who all acquired their interests by 
conveyances dated after the recording of Masseys 1ax titles, took subject to those titles. The 
Defendants have failed to carry their burden of demonstrating how undisputed material facts and 
the law support their motions for summary judgment. The trial court erred in granting those 
motions. 
DATED this (0 day of February, 2005 
FRANKS WARNER 
Attorney for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Ruling Conditionally Denying Summary Judgment. Dated 
February 11,2004. 
2. Video Transcript. Telephone Conference. Dated February 24, 
2004. 
3. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Dated May 21, 2004. 
4. Order. Dated May 21, 2004. 
5. Survey of Cynthia L. Segriff, Registered Land Surveyor. R. at 839. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
..:>„.. 
_ _ . _ _ _ — — .
 {y ,.;,, 
" y 
H.C. MASSEY and BETTY P. MASSEY, I RULING 
CONDITIONALLY DENYING 
Plaintiffs, | SUMMARY JUDGMENT ° , 
vs. | v<: >..... '"/? 
j Case No. 960900027 PR y 
KENNETH A. GRIFFITHS, et al., | Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
Defendant's. 1 ^EB 1 1 2004 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant 12X12 LLC (12X12) and Defendant's Buttars 
and Lewis' (Buttars) Motions for Summary Judgment. Both 12X12 and Buttars contend they and 
their predecessor owners have always paid taxes on the property claimed by Massey's and therefore, 
Weber County had no title to convey with the tax deeds given to Massey's. They contend that the 
fence lines have created a boundary by acquiescence that should control ownership of the property 
in question and resolve any boundary discrepancies from the recorded deeds. 
Plaintiffs claim that the descriptions in their tax deeds establish the ownership of the property 
to them. They further claim that the tax payment evidence filed by movant's is hearsay and that this 
Court cannot accept such hearsay evidence. They contend that the affidavits filed contain legal 
conclusions rather than facts, and should be disregarded in that respect, leaving substantial material 
evidentiary disputes. They further argue that the property interest claims of these present Defendant's 
are all subsequent to the Massey's tax deeds and therefore are inferior to Massey's claims. 
The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence to grant summary judgment and denies 
those motions. The Court notes, however, that admissible evidence is very possibly available to show 
RULING CONDITIONALLY DENYING SUMMARY JUDGft 
Massey vs. Griffiths, et al. 
960900027 PR 
Page 2 of6 
taxes have been paid by each of the defendant's or their predecessors on the recorded deeds of 
property they claim. 
It will undoubtedly be helpful to all parties to know the tentative conclusions of law the Court 
has reached in reviewing the case. 
1. TAX DEEDS. 
Tax deeds in Utah have been given a substantial priority status under UCA §78-12-5.2, 5.3 
& Utah case law. However, the Court concludes that based on the uncontroverted facts of this case, 
the plaintiff tax deed holders do not necessarily gain a priority of position over recorded deed holders, 
even though subsequent holders behind the Massey tax deeds might not have been in occupancy at 
the time the tax deeds issued, provided those title holders otherwise held good title. Therefore, based 
on the uncontroverted evidence in this case, if it is shown by competent evidence that taxes were paid 
on the deeded property at issue in this case in a timely fashion, the Weber County tax deeds would 
have been improperly issued, and as to those lands upon which the taxes were paid timely, are inferior 
to the otherwise valid title holders in this case to such property. The Court also rejects Plaintiffs 
argument that the Massey Deeds should have priority over subsequent title holders who can trace 
their titles to title holders described above (and in the next succeeding paragraph.) 
2. BOUNDARIES BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
The Court concludes that in this case, all relevant deeded property parcels may be modified 
pursuant to the legal concepts of boundaries by acquiescence, and if that resulted historically in 
possessed land different than shown by recorded deeds or conveyances, and the tax payment 
conditions have been met as set forth in the paragraph above relating to 'tax deeds', the resultant 
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parcels will also possess a priority over the tax deeds. In other words, if Massey claims lands 
possessed by persons entitled to establish boundaries different than shown by the recorded deeds and 
they show payment of taxes on their adjacent record deeded property, the Court concludes those 
property lines established by boundary by acquiescence will be acceptable to include the additional 
(or exclude the excess) property in their parcels, even though the boundaries are different than shown 
on the recorded deeds, and may thereby defeat the Massey tax deed claims. 
3. QUIT CLAIM DEEDS. 
The Court concludes that a quit claim deed conveys everything that the grantor possessed and 
even though a quit claim deed may have been recorded after a tax deed, it may have priority over the 
tax deed if the property meets the standards set forth above in the two preceding paragraphs. 
4. THE MASSEY WEBER COUNTY TAX DEEDS. 
If Weber County issues tax deeds on property upon which the taxes have always been paid 
on record title and which boundaries have been changed from the recorded title by the concept of 
boundaries by acquiescence, then those tax deeds on such property are null and void as to any person 
now holding an otherwise legitimate title by recorded conveyance, including the modified boundary 
by acquiescence. 
5. NONINCLUDED PROPERTY. 
In the event the Massey tax deeds include property upon which the taxes were not paid as 
described above, or pursuant to other legitimate rules regarding assessments and levy for taxes OR 
property that is not included in the recorded deeded property as modified through the boundary 
established by acquiescence and Weber County did properly assess and then sell at the Massey tax 
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sales, this other property the Court finds is 'nonincluded' property pursuant to the foregoing legal 
conclusions, then it would appear that Massey's would be entitled to a clear title to such property 
which might be included in their tax deeds (noting the exclusion of the Questar property.). 
The Court is aware that there may be problems with corner markers, topographical surveys, 
and perhaps the Gilgen survey in this case. If adjoining parties have historically accepted certain land 
boundaries that are different than actual surveys and recorded deeds, those boundary lines accepted 
and acknowledged over many years will prevail over actual surveys or topographical overlays. 
Additionally, as stated above, the tax deeds will not be given priority over conveyances before and 
after issuance of the tax deeds, provided the conditions outlined above by the Court are met. 
In summary, for Massey to prevail herein, they must show the property they are claiming did 
not have taxes assessed and paid and was different land than taxes were paid on and this also prohibits 
the Massey's tax deeds from disturbing boundaries established by acquiescence. On the other hand, 
if Massey's bought other property which was assessed and taxes were not paid, their claim would be 
valid as to that property. The Court rejects Plaintiffs argument that the tax deeds should be given 
such validity as to extinguish the claims of the subsequent title holders to the property described by 
the Court above. The conclusions apply to the conditions stated by the Court and uncontroverted 
facts of this case and on the legal concept that unless Weber County had a proper legal basis to issue 
their tax deeds they are void ab initio as to that land improperly sold. 
The Court orders that for trial, the parties stipulate to all tax receipts that are not actually in 
controversy, and all other official records as such. All other admissible exhibits and documents must 
be stipulated to for admissibility though weight of all evidence will of course remain with the Court. 
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Each party should make every effort to complete stipulations and clearly identify all final exhibits at 
least one week prior to trial. Any objections to any particular exhibits must be forwarded to the 
Court with the written objection in detail on or before February 26, 2004. Not more than a three (3) 
page trial brief shall be submitted by each party at least one week prior to trial on or before Tuesday, 
February 24, 2004. Trial is scheduled to start Wednesday, March 3, 2004 at nine o'clock. 
DATED this / day of February, 2004. 
ROGER S<DUTSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum to the 
following parties by first class mail, postage prepaid, this ^\ day of February, 2004: 
FRANK S. WARNER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3544 Lincoln Avenue, Suite F 
Ogden,UT 84401 
M. DARIN HAMMOND 
Attorney for Defendant's 
Aaron B. Buttars, Brenda L. Buttars, 
and Adele B. Lewis 
4723 Harrison Blvd., #200 
Ogden, UT 84403 
RAY G. MARTINEAU 
Attorney for Defendant's 
Kenneth A. Griffiths, BKB, L L.C and 
12X12,L.L.C. 
3098 Highland Drive #450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
C 
Massey vs. Griffiths, et al. 
960900027 PR 
Page 6 of6 
DOUGLAS S. STOWELL 
Attorney for Defendant's 
Kenneth A. Griffiths, BKB, L.L.C. and 
12X12, L.L.C. 
307 East Stanton Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DEPUTY COURT CLERK 
S37 
Tab 2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-k -k -k k -k 
H.C. MASSEY AND BETTY MASSEY, 
PLAINTIFFS, 
VS. 
KEN GRIFFITHS, ET AL., 
DEFENDANT. 
SEP i %
 7mA 
.4 
VIDEO TRANSCRIPT 
CASE NO. 960900027 
"k k -k "k ic 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
FEBRUARY 24, 2004 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR 
FOR 
THE 
THE 
HONORABLE 
PLAINTIFFS: 
DEFENDANTS: 
REPORTED/TRANSCRIBED BY DEAN 
2525 
OGDEN 
(801) 
ROGER 
* *k -k ~k -k 
***** 
S. DUTSON 
WILLIAM F. DAINES 
M. DARIN HAMMOND 
RAY G. MARTINEAU 
DOUGLAS L. STOWEL 
OLSEN, CSR 
GRANT AVENUE 
, UTAH 84401 
395-1056 lOtj 
2 
RAY 
THE 
THE 
OGDEN, UTAH FEBRUARY 24, 2004 
COURT: 
CLERK: 
HI. 
HI. I'VE GOT FRANK WARNER, DOUG STOWELL, 
MARTINEAU, AND DARIN HAMMOND ON THE PHONE. AND THIS WAS 
ON BECAUSE I THINK WE WERE — WE HAD A JURY TRIAL CONFIRMED 
FOR FRIDAY, AND WE WERE GONNA CUT THEIR TRIAL SHORT. BUT 
THERE'S A MOTION 
THE 
THE 
COURT: 
CLERK: 
OKAY. I'VE 
THE 
MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
WARNER: 
TO CONTINUE ON THAT TRIAL FRIDAY, SO — 
OKAY. 
OKAY. HOLD ON. 
GOT JUDGE DUTSON ON THE LINE. 
GOOD MORNING. 
GOOD MORNING, JUDGE. THIS IS FRANK WARNER. 
MARTINEAU: AND, JUDGE, THIS IS RAY MARTINEAU. 
STOWELL 
HAMMOND 
COURT: 
STOWELL 
YOUR HONOR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: 
HAMMOND 
COURT: 
GOTTEN MY LATEST 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
WARNER: 
: DOUG STOWELL, YOUR HONOR. 
: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR. 
EXCUSE ME, I DIDN'T GET THAT LAST ONE? 
: I'M SORRY, DOUG STOWELL, ALSO ON THE LINE, 
OKAY. 
: AND DARIN HAMMOND. 
ALL RIGHT. NOW, I ASSUME ALL OF YOU HAVE 
RULING? 
YES. 
MARTINEAU: WE DID. 
COURT: AND I WOULD ASSUME THIS IS GOING TO PERHAPS 
12 
12 
$*«*? 
IS 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
EXPEDITE SOME OF THE TRIAL TIME, BUT PERHAPS, YOU KNOW, I'M 
MISTAKEN, I DON'T KNOW. MR. WARNER, WHAT'S YOUR TAKE ON 
WHERE — WHERE YOU'RE GOING TO BE GOING NOW WITH THIS RULING? 
MR. WARNER: WELL, I — I THINK YOUR RULING'S GOING TO 
EXPEDITE THINGS TREMENDOUSLY, NOT — NOT TO MY SATISFACTION, 
I DARE SAY — 
THE COURT: RIGHT, I UNDERSTAND THAT. 
MR. WARNER: BUT IT SEEMS TO ME, IN FACT, AS I'VE BEEN 
THINKING ABOUT THIS AND EVEN THINKING ABOUT IT MORE THROUGH 
. THE NIGHT THAT WHAT YOU'VE DONE IS YOU'VE — YOUR RULING IS 
CALLED A CONDITIONAL DENIAL OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
AND AS I READ — 
MR. MARTINEAU: FRANK, I'M HAVING A LITTLE TROUBLE 
HEARING YOU. COULD YOU SPEAK UP A LITTLE? 
MR. WARNER: YOUR MOTION IS CALLED A CONDITIONAL DENIAL 
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND AS I ANALYZE IT, PERHAPS THE ONLY 
REASON IT IS CONDITIONAL IS BECAUSE OF MY OBJECTIONS, 
SOMEWHAT OF A TECHNICAL NATURE CONCERNING THE HEARSAY NATURE 
OF SOME OF THE EXHIBITS AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF SOME OF THE 
EXHIBITS SUPPORTING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
LET ME SAY, YOUR HONOR, THAT I DO NOT HAVE ANY EVIDENCE 
THAT WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT PAID TAXES ON 
THE TAX NOTICES THAT HAVE BEEN SENT TO THEM OVER THE YEARS, 
NOR DO I HAVE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THERE IS ANY PARCEL OF 
PROPERTY AT ISSUE HERE THAT HASN'T BEEN OCCUPIED BY THE 
DEFENDANTS OVER THE YEARS. AND THOSE SEEM TO BE THE TWO — 
THE COURT: RIGHT --
MR. WARNER: — AREAS LEFT OPEN IN YOUR — IN YOUR 
JUDGMENT. SO I'M ALMOST — ALTHOUGH I'D LIKE TO ARGUE THIS 
FOREVER, I'M ALMOST WONDERING IF — IF WE ADMIT AND STIPULATE 
THOSE FACTS, IF — IF YOU'RE NOT PREPARED TO RULE ON THIS 
MATTER. 
THE COURT: WELL, I — I WAS CONCERNED AND AM CONCERNED 
AS TO EXACTLY WHERE THERE MIGHT BE ANY PROPERTY THAT WAS NOT 
COVERED BY WHAT YOU'VE JUST RELATED. IN OTHER WORDS, IF THE 
TAX DEEDS INCLUDED SOME PROPERTY THAT WAS IN A — IN AN AREA 
THAT WAS NOT INCLUDED IN WHAT THE PARTIES WERE CLAIMING — 
SEE, I DIDN'T — I HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING FOR CERTAIN THAT 
THAT'S THE CASE BASED ON WHAT'S BEFORE ME. AND SO IF WHAT 
YOU'RE SAYING IS EVERYTHING IS INCLUDED WITHIN THE PROPERTY 
THAT THEY HAVE OCCUPIED, THEN I THINK YOU'RE RIGHT. 
MR. WARNER: WELL, IT'S CERTAINLY A FACT. I MEAN, I — 
WE CAN'T DISPUTE THAT. WHAT WE CLAIM — WHAT WE'RE CLAIMING 
IS EITHER OCCUPIED WAS ORIGINALLY OCCUPIED BY MOUNTAIN FUEL 
OR QUESTAR AS TO THAT PARCEL, AND THEN THE OTHER TWO 
DEFENDANTS ON THE NORTH — 
THE COURT: EVERYTHING IS INCLUDED IN IT THEN. 
MR. WARNER: SO FAR AS OCCUPATION LINES ARE CONCERNED, 
YES. 
THE COURT: OKAY. WELL, THEN, THAT DOES SEEM TO BRING 
0 TO A HEAD. 
MR. WARNER: THE — THE ONLY ISSUES THAT REALLY HAVEN'T 
BQ&N DECIDED AND IN THE ~ IN VIEW OF -- IF THAT'S THE WAY 
$00'RE GOING TO RULE, IT'S PROBABLY MOOT AT THIS POINT. THE 
CHLY ISSUE THAT HASN'T BEEN DECIDED WOULD BE WHERE EXACTLY 
flOSE TAX DEEDS LIE, HOW MUCH OF EACH DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY 
tHEY COVER, AND I THINK THERE'S SOME DISPUTE — I THINK THERE 
NftY BE SOME DISPUTE ON THAT. MY EXPERT HAS PRESENTED AND 
HE'VE PRESENTED IN VARIOUS MOTIONS TO THE COURT A COPY OF HER 
SORVEY. THE DEFENDANT'S ARE WELL AWARE OF IT, BUT I THINK 
THEY — I THINK AT LEAST MR. MARTINEAU'S CLIENTS DISPUTE 
THAT. BUT THAT ALL SEEMS TO BE MOOT AT THIS POINT IF — IF 
1TOUR HONOR'S — 
THE COURT: WELL, IF EVERYTHING CLOSES, YES, I THINK SO. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: YOU MEAN IF THE DEED CLOSES — 
THE COURT: ANYBODY HAVE A DIFFERENT READ ON THIS? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: YOUR HONOR, WHEN YOU SAY IF 
EVERYTHING CLOSES, ARE YOU REFERRING TO THE LEGAL 
DESCRIPTIONS IN THE DEEDS? 
THE COURT: NO. I'M TALKING ABOUT CLOSING THE -- THE 
BOUNDARIES BY ACQUIESCENCE — 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: UH-HUH. 
THE COURT: ~ AS WELL AS LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS. YOU KNOW, 
IF — IF THEY DON'T CLOSE BY LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS BUT THEY DO 
BY BOUNDARIES BY ACQUIESCENCE, THEN I DO THINK MR. WARNER IS 
CORRECT IN — IN INTERPRETING WHAT I HAVE RULED. 
MR. MARTINEAU: YOUR HONOR, I THINK THE RECORD HEREIN 
ESTABLISHES THAT VERY CLEARLY, THAT EITHER ~ THAT WHAT IS IN 
POSSESSION AND TAXES HAVE BEEN PAID ON INCLUDES NOT ONLY WHAT 
IS IN THE DEEDS, BUT ALSO WHAT HAS BEEN OCCUPIED TO GIVE US A 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE CLAIM. I THINK THAT APPLIES BOTH 
TO — WITH REGARD TO THE GRIFFITHS' INTERESTS AS WELL AS THE 
BUTTERS. 
THE COURT: WELL, THAT — THAT VERY WELL MAY BE. I — 
AS I'VE STATED, IN LOOKING AT MS. SEGRIFF'S DIAGRAM, IT'S A 
LITTLE HARD FOR ME BECAUSE I — I CANNOT REALLY TELL WHICH OF 
THE TAX DEEDS COVERS WHAT. I JUST HAVE THE TOTALITY I THINK 
OF THE TAX DEEDS SHOWN IN THERE. ISN'T THAT CORRECT, 
MR. WARNER? 
MR. WARNER: ACTUALLY, THEY'RE — THEY'RE PLOTTED 
INDIVIDUALLY THERE, BUT I -- I CONCEDE THAT THE BOUNDARIES 
BETWEEN THEM ARE HARD TO SEE. THEY — THEY DO — THEY DO — 
THE FOUR OF THEM TOGETHER DO CLOSE AS ONE UNIT — 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. WARNER: — AND HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN ASSIGNED ONE 
TAX NUMBER BY THE COUNTY. 
THE COURT: HAVE THEY? OKAY. ALL RIGHT. THEN IF THE 
FACTS AREN'T IN CONTROVERSY, I THINK MY RULING WOULD RESOLVE 
THIS MATTER. 
MR. WARNER: BUT WHAT I'M CONCERNED ABOUT, YOUR HONOR, 
7 
THAT WE HAVE A GOOD CLEAN RECORD. I OWE MY CLIENT THAT 
THE COURT: CERTAINLY. 
MR. WARNER: — (UNINTELLIGIBLE) REASON, AND SO I ~ 
I — MY ONLY QUESTION — 
THE COURT: WELL, SHOULD WE — 
MR. WARNER: — IS HOW WE GET FROM HERE TO A — A 
FGCORD, AND I JUST — IF I MAY SUGGEST THIS, PERHAPS — 
W5RHAPS IT AMOUNTS TO YOUR ISSUING AN ADDITIONAL RULING — 
FCKE HOW THE OTHER PARTIES FEEL ABOUT THIS, BUT JUST ISSUING 
ADDITIONAL RULING ACKNOWLEDGING THAT IN THIS TELEPHONE 
INFERENCE, THE PLAINTIFF CONCEDED THOSE PARTICULAR FACTS. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. WARNER: THAT MAKE SENSE? 
THE COURT: THAT MAY VERY WELL THEN CLARIFY EVERYTHING, 
DOES ANYONE SEE A PROBLEM WITH THAT? 
MR. MARTINEAU: WE DON'T, YOUR HONOR. WHAT I WOULD 
LIKE, I THINK WHERE IT IS MR. WARNER'S BURDEN, IF HE WOULD 
COME UP WITH A STIPULATION TO THAT EFFECT AND LET US, MYSELF, 
STOWELL, AND DARIN HAMMOND, LOOK AT THAT AND SEE IF WE CAN'T 
21{ SIGN A STIPULATION THAT PUTS THAT AT REST. 
THE COURT: AS FAR AS FACTS ARE CONCERNED. 
MR. MARTINEAU: YES. 
THE COURT: YES. AND THEN I'LL GO AHEAD WITH MY FINAL 
RULING ON THE LEGAL QUESTIONS. 
If 
'23 
24 
»5 
8 
rr WE HAVE A TRIAL SCHEDULED — 
.MR. MARTINEAU: NEXT WEDNESDAY. 
THE COURT: -- NEXT WEDNESDAY, AND I'D CERTAINLY LIKE TO 
•HAVE THIS WRAPPED UP THIS WEEK THEN OR WE CO — WE 
HAVE TO HAVE A HEARING TO FINALIZE IT ON THE RECORD ON 
5DAY, AND THAT WOULD BE JUST ADDITION EXPENSE FOR EACH 
?vY0PR CLIENTS. HOW DO YOU WANNA DO THIS, MR. WARNER? 
4k MR. WARNER: WELL, THAT'S -- THAT'S EXACTLY WHY I, 
l& — AFTER CONSIDERING YOUR RULING, AM PREPARED TO MAKE 
:'CONCESSIONS I AM. THAT IS ~ 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. WARNER: — BECAUSE I DON'T SEE THE POINT IN THE 
SITIONAL EXPENSES FOR MY CLIENTS OR THE OTHER PARTIES' 
SJENTS AND — 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THEN — 
l
- MR. WARNER: — BUT IT STILL SEEMS TO ME, YOUR HONOR, 
\T IT ISN'T EVEN NECESSARY THAT WE ENTER INTO A WRITTEN 
?STIPULATION; THAT YOU COULD SIMPLY RECITE IN YOUR RULING 
|rfHAT — THAT WE CONCEDED AS TO THOSE FACTS. 
MR. MARTINEAU: WELL, I THINK THERE OUGHTA BE 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) --
MR. WARNER: THERE ARE ONLY TWO FACTS — 
MR. MARTINEAU: — FACTS, JUDGE. 
THE COURT: WELL, MR. WARNER, IF YOU'LL JUST PUT ON THE 
RECORD VERY CLEARLY RIGHT NOW THEN WHAT YOU ARE CONCEDING. 
'15 BEING RECORDED AND IT WILL BE A GOOD RECORD OF THAT, 
'£ WITH YOU, THEN YOU WOULDN'T HAVE TO DO ANYTHING MORE. 
DON'T YOU GO — 
\ MR. MARTINEAU: THAT SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT. 
f 
> *HE COURT: WHY DON'T YOU GO AHEAD AND STATE THEN 
Y WHAT YOUR STIPULATION IS. 
h MR. WARNER: WELL, I — WE — WE CONCEDE THAT THE 
ITY IN QUESTION THAT WE CLAIM UNDER THE TAX DEEDS HAS 
^RICALLY BEEN OCCUPIED BY THE DEFENDANTS AND THEIR 
ECESSORS IN INTEREST TOGETHER WITH THE — THE QUESTAR GAS 
PERTY AND THEIR PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST. IT'S ONE OF THE 
"E PARTIES HAVE OCCUPIED ALL OF THAT PROPERTY WHICH WE ARE 
IMING UNDER OUR TAX DEEDS. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: FOR AT LEAST 20 YEARS? 
-AV MR. WARNER: FOR AT LEAST 20 YEARS. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: AND DO YOU CONCEDE THAT THE 
SgFENDANTS PAID TAXES ON ALL THOSE PROPERTIES? 
MR. WARNER: WELL, I CONCEDE THAT THERE'S AN ISSUE AS TO 
( HEAT THEY PAID TAXES ON, BUT I THINK THE COURT HAS VERY — 
•t,VERY CLEARLY SEEN OUR POSITION ON THAT, AND THAT IS, THE 
TAXES HAVE BEEN PAID ON LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS WHICH DON'T 
NECESSARILY MEET AND CLOSE, AND THERE ARE --
THE COURT: RIGHT, RIGHT. 
MR. WARNER: -- BUT IN -- BUT THE COURT'S RULING GOES 
BEYOND THAT AND SAYS THAT THAT ISN'T NECESSARY, THAT SO LONG 
10 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE IS THERE, THAT SOLVES THAT 
FROM THE COURT'S POINT OF VIEW IN THIS RULING, 
gf THE COURT: OKAY. THAT — YEAH, I DON'T THINK THAT 
IER CAN CONCEDE THAT THE TAXES HAVE BEEN PAID ON ALL 
?i»PERTY IN THE LE — OR — OR BEYOND THAT PROPERTY WHICH 
EXCEED OR BE DIFFERENT THAN THE LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS. 
* MR. WARNER: THAT'S — THAT'S PRECISELY OUR POINT, 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: WE'RE — WE'RE MERELY ASKING THAT 
HDOHCEDE THAT — THAT ALL THE DEFENDANTS PAID TAXES ON THE 
IhS THAT THEY WERE ISSUED BILLS ON. 
MR. WARNER: I WOULD CONCEDE THAT THEY HAVE PAID TAXES 
Sfs" 
• c , 
jj.TOE TAX NOTICES THAT WERE ISSUED TO THEM BY THE COUNTY. 
*' UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: AND — 
THE COURT: VERY WELL. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: -- AND YOU'RE ALSO CONCEDING, 
K, THAT THE BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE IS KIND OF A OF 
|fJftKE-UP CALL FOR ANY — ANY CHALLENGE TO ANY — ANY 
'jPESCRIPTION IN ALL OF THE PROPERTY THAT WE'RE DEALING WITH 
HERE. 
MR. WARNER: I THINK THAT WAS THE (UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
THE COURT: HE DOESN'T CONCEDE THAT, BUT THE COURT'S 
RULED THAT. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER- OKAY. 
11 
MR. WARNER: THAT'S A LEGAL ISSUE I THINK THAT THE COURT 
RULED AGAINST US ON, 
THE COURT: RIGHT. NOW, I HAVE ONE QUESTION NOW THAT 
W&$ IS ON THE RECORD: HOW DID THESE TAX DEEDS EVER GET 
SERRATED? JUST -- WAS THERE -- WAS THERE A REVIEW BY THE 
DQGirFY SURVEYOR'S OFFICE THAT SAW THE DISCREPANCY IN THE ~ 
LEGAL — RECORDED LEGAL DESCRIPTION AND JUST DID THIS IN 
OFFICE THEN OR WHAT — WHAT HAPPENED? 
MR. MARTINEAU- THERE WAS NEVER ANY REVIEW BY THE COUNTY 
WBRVEYOR'S OFFICE. THIS ALL WAS GENERATED AND CAME OUT OF 
^g ASSESSOR'S OFFICE — 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. MARTINEAU: — BASED — 
THE COURT: SO THEY JUST DID IT IN THE OFFICE BASED ON 
SHERE THE — 
MR. MARTINEAU: BASED — 
THE COURT: — BOUNDARIES CLOSED — 
MR. MARTINEAU: BASED (UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
THE COURT: — ON THE RECORDED DEEDS. 
MR. MARTINEAU: IT WAS BASED ON A STRAY DEED BACK IN THE 
JRECORD TITLE, AND THAT'S HOW THAT CAME ABOUT. 
MR. WARNER: YEAH, I DON'T NECESSARILY AGREE WITH THAT. 
'LET — LET ME TELL YOU WHAT MY VIEW OF IT IS, YOUR HONOR, AND 
I DIDN'T REALLY INTEND TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON THIS BECAUSE I 
-DIDN'T THINK (UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
12 
f&WB COURT: WELL, NO, I THINK IT'S MORE A MATTER OF 
5ITY TO THE COURT THAN ANYTHING RIGHT NOW. 
§# HR- WARNER: I — I'VE SPOKE WITH SOME PEOPLE OF — FROM 
I 
£ASSESSOR'S OFFICE THAT THERE WERE HISTORICALLY, AND 
JHTLY WHAT HAPPENS IS THE COUNTY RECORDER RECORDS THESE 
5, AND THEY ARE OBLIGATED TO FURNISH THE LEGAL 
[PTIONS TO THE COUNTY ASSESSOR FOR TAX PURPOSES. THAT'S 
— THAT'S WHERE THIS ALL ORIGINATES UNDER UTAH LAW. 
— AND WHAT HAPPENED BACK AT SOME POINT IN TIME IS, IS 
r WHEN THESE DESCRIPTIONS DIDN'T MATCH UP ON THE COUNTY'S 
CT ONE-MILE SQUARE GRID THAT THEY USE FOR EVERY SECTION 
jjftEHE COUNTY, IT WOULD — IT WOULD LEAVE GAPS SOMETIMES IN 
MIDDLE, AND SO THEY WOULD ~ THE COUNTY RECORDER WOULD — 
ISSUE COPIES OF — OR LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS ON THESE GAPS, 
*£ — IN THE LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS TO THE COUNTY ASSESSOR. 
THE COUNTY ASSESSOR STARTED TAXING THESE AND THEY CALL 
REMAINING PARCELS. THE TERM (UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
fe|teTHE COURT: WHEN DID THAT START? 
JfiMR. WARNER: APPARENTLY IT'S A PRACTICE THAT HAS — HAS 
GOING ON FOR SOME TIME AND -- AND THERE'S BEEN A LOT OF 
5E ISSUED. IT STARTED — I'M NOT SURE THE EXACT DATE. OF 
JRSE PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THESE DEEDS. 
MR. MARTINEAU: THESE GAPS ARE BASED UPON A STRAY DEED 
IN THE RECORD TITLE. 
MR. WARNER: WELL, MR. MARTINEAU (UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
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THE COURT: WELL (UNINTELLIGIBLE) GENERATED — THAT WAS 
PROBABLY A DEED GENERATED BY THE ASSESSOR'S OFFICE OR THE 
"RECORDER'S OFFICE. 
MR. WARNER: MY VIEW IS, IS THAT STRAY DEED, THERE IS A 
DEED THERE AND IT'S — IT — IT ISN'T IN THE CHAIN OF TITLE, 
I ADMIT THAT. WAS — WAS EITHER GENERATED, AS YOU SUGGEST, 
YOUR HONOR, OR IT WAS GENERATED BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES 
-RECOGNIZING — 
MR. MARTINEAU: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
MR. WARNER: -- THAT THE (UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
MR. MARTINEAU: IT WAS MISTAKENLY GENERATED BY ONE OF 
l^ fHE PARTIES WAY BACK, AND IT'S — IT'S NOT IN THE CHAIN OF 
IflTLE, BUT IT'S IN THE RECORD TITLE, AND THAT'S WHERE THIS 
£ftU. COMES FROM. 
MR. WARNER: YEAH, BUT — 
THE COURT: UH-HUH. 
MR. WARNER: BUT A LOT OF THESE REMAINING PARCELS DIDN'T 
PUVE THOSE KIND OF DEEDS TO BACK * EM UP THAT THIS 
^UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
THE COURT: WELL, NOW, THERE'S ONE OTHER FACTOR HERE, 
'/ALTHOUGH THE COUNTY ISN'T BROUGHT INTO THIS, THE MASSEYS PAID 
WQME MONEY TO THE COUNTY FOR THIS, AND THEY GOT NOTHING, 
0 — 
MR. WARNER: WELL, AND THEY CONTINUED TO PAY TAXES ON IT 
fPUINTELLIGIBLE) — 
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THE COURT: WHAT? 
MR. WARNER: THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO PAY TAXES ON IT 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
THE COURT: AND THEY'VE CONTINUED — 
MR. MARTINEAU: YOUR HONOR, THAT GOES WITH THE TAX DEED. 
THEY GET WHATEVER THE — THE COUNTY HAD, WHICH IF THEY HAD 
NOTHING, THEY GET NOTHING. 
THE COURT: WELL, BUT THEN IF THERE WAS NOTHING THERE, 
THEY PROBABLY ARE ENTITLED TO A REFUND. BUT I DON'T ~ 
THEY'RE NOT BROUGHT INTO THIS ONE, SO I GUESS WE DON'T NEED 
TO WORRY ABOUT THAT. 
MR. WARNER: THERE'S — THERE IS A PROVISION IN STATE 
LAW WHICH SAYS THAT IN THE EVENT -- IN THE EVENT THE TAX DEED 
ylS FOUND TO BE INVALID, THAT THE GRANTEE OF THE TAX DEED 
if 
f^SHALL HAVE A LIEN ON THE PROPERTY WHICH SHALL BE FORECLOSED 
IN THE SAME PROCEEDING AS THE DETERMINATION OF THE INVALIDITY 
lfOF THE TAX DEED. AND I THINK I HAVE THAT IN MY OTHER ROOM 
* SPHERE SITTING ON TABLE. A LAW I JUST RAN ACROSS THE OTHER 
f;J3(AY, AND IT'S AN ISSUE I'D LIKE TO HOLD OPEN IN THIS 
1 ^  
I 
IRTTER — 
THE COURT: NOT AGAINST THESE PARTIES, BUT THE COUNTY. 
V MR. WARNER: WELL, IT SAYS A LIEN AGAINST THE PROPERTY, 
go — 
''p THE COURT: WELL, IF IT SAYS A LIEN AGAINST THE 
Ik 
'JPROPERTY, THEN THAT WOULD BE EXTINGUISHED UNDER MY RULING, 
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HOWEVER — 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: YES, ABSOLUTELY. 
MR. WARNER: IT WOULD — 
MR. MARTINEAU: ABSOLUTELY. THIS ~ THIS IS NO TIME TO 
RAISE THAT ISSUE AT ALL. 
THE COURT: WELL, IT — IT VERY WELL IS THE TIME TO 
RAISE IT IF IT'S GOING TO BE RAISED BECAUSE IT NEEDS TO BE 
* RESOLVED IF IT'S GOING TO BE RAISED. 
MR. WARNER: MAY I FURNISH THE COURT AND THE PARTIES A 
CITATION TO THAT FOR WHAT IT'S WORTH AND PERHAPS ~ 
THE COURT: WELL, I — I WOULD APPRECIATE THAT, AND THEN 
| KHEN I ISSUE MY FINAL RULING IN NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS, I WILL 
ADDRESS THAT ISSUE AS IT RELATES TO THESE PARTIES. 
MR. WARNER: I'LL FURNISH A COPY OF THAT. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE WE NEED 
TO DISCUSS? 
I UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: WELL, YOUR HONOR, WITH REGARD TO 
;-"THE TAX DEEDS, WILL YOUR RULING INCLUDE SOMETHING THAT 
|- SOGGESTS THAT THOSE DEEDS ARE NO LONGER VALID BECAUSE THERE'S 
;MO PROPERTY TO SUPPORT THEM? WE JUST DON'T WANT AN ISSUE 
\l$KE THIS TO COME UP AGAIN IN THE FUTURE. 
THE COURT: WELL, THAT'S WHAT I'M TALKING ABOUT REALLY. 
.^..J>I WANT TO BRING THIS THING TO A FINAL CONCLUSION EVEN IF WE 
tVE TO BRING THE COUNTY IN SOME WAY. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO 
IfeiteVIEW THAT STATUTE OR — OR ORDER THAT — OR RULING THAT 
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| |SL WARNER HAS FOUND AND — SO WILL YOU FORWARD THAT TO MY 
W F I C E IMMEDIATELY AND TO EACH OF THE PARTIES? 
MR. WARNER: I WILL. 
THE COURT: TODAY. 
MR. MARTINEAU: FRANK, COULD YOU GIVE US THE CITATION TO 
| g A T OR THE REFERENCE TO THE CODE? 
MR. WARNER: I DON'T HAVE IT IN FRONT OF ME, RAY, BUT 
I ' L L — I ' L L FAX IT TO YOU IMMEDIATELY. I T ' S IN MY OFFICE. 
IF THE PARTIES WANNA HOLD, I ' L L SEE I F I CAN PUT MY HANDS ON 
BP. 
THE COURT: WELL — 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I AM FAMILIAR WITH THAT STATUTE, 
i l O THAT STATUTE SUGGESTS THAT THE SALE WAS ORIGINALLY A 
&KLID SALE. IN OTHER WORDS, YOU CAN'T HAVE A LIEN ON 
PSMfcTHING THAT DOESN'T EXIST. AND I F A TAX SALE WAS DONE 
IMPROPERLY WITHOUT GIVING PROPER NOTICE, THEN IT DOES GO BACK 
W THE ORIGINAL OWNER, AND THE TAX DEED CLAIMANT WOULD HAVE A 
SIEN. BUT THAT DOESN'T APPLY TO OUR SITUATION WHERE THE 
B©0RT I S FINDING THAT THE TAX DEED ITSELF WASN'T EVER VALID. 
MR. WARNER: WELL, LET ME FAX THAT TO EACH OF THE 
•UNTIES AND THE COURT. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I F THERE'S A FURTHER NEED FOR 
•»££PHONE CONFERENCE, MY CLERK WILL GET IN TOUCH WITH ALL OF 
•BB. 
MR. WARNER: OKAY. 
mmmmnm • . 
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THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE WE NEED TO DISCUSS? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: THAT'S IT. THANK YOU. 
MR. MARTINEAU: WE — WE CERTAINLY WANT FOR THIS TO LAY 
TO REST ANY CLAIMS THAT THE GRIFFITHS GROUP OR THE -- OR 
" THE — THE — 
MR. WARNER: BUTTERS. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: BUTTERS. 
YR, MR. MARTINEAU: — BUTTERS GROUP DON * T HAVE A CLEAR 
",TLE TO THEIR PROPERTY FROM THIS POINT FORWARD. 
THE COURT: WELL, OF COURSE --
MR. MARTINEAU: THERE'S A LOT OF EXPENSE INVOLVED HERE, 
OF LEGAL MANEUVERING, LOT OF ISSUES. WE NEED TO MAKE 
THAT WHATEVER'S DONE LAYS THIS THING FINALLY TO REST. 
THE COURT: WELL, LET ME JUST MENTION ONE THING THAT HAS 
TO MY MIND SEVERAL TIMES, MR. MARTINEAU. THAT IS THIS: 
^RULING OR THE — THE CLAIMS BETWEEN BUTTERS AND THE 
3TFITH GROUP I ADDRESS IN THIS RULING. AND IT SHOULD BE 
<;END OF IT AS FAR AS THOSE TWO PARTIES ARE CONCERNED ALSO. 
:,THEY ARE NOT ADVERSE PARTIES TO EACH OTHER IN THIS CASE. 
— AND WE ALL KNOW HOW AS YEARS GO ON, BOUNDARIES BY 
IESCENCE CAN ALWAYS RAISE THEIR UGLY HEAD. I'M THINKING 
"ft THESE TWO PARTIES OR THEIR SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST SHOULD 
SURE THAT THERE'S SOMETHING RECORDED THAT CLARIFIES 
IB BOUNDARIES OR THAT SOMETHING OCCURS TO RESOLVE ANY 
TEE CLAIMS REGARDING THEIR BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE TWO OF 
-$ , 
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THEM BECAUSE IT'S CERTAINLY BEEN ADDRESSED IN THIS CASE, BUT 
IT ISN'T A RULING AS TO WHERE THEIR BOUNDARY LINES ARE 
BECAUSE I'VE NEVER ACTUALLY HAD A HEARING ON — BETWEEN THOSE 
ffQ PARTIES WHO COULD BE ADVERSE PARTIES. YOU SEE WHAT I'M 
SPYING? 
MR. MARTINEAU: YES. WELL, I THINK IF WE TAKE YOUR 
jlKJNOR'S RULING WHEN IT COMES DOWN — AND I ASSUME YOU'LL WANT 
JfTODINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PREPARED — I THINK 
VT DARIN AND I CAN TAKE THAT AND WE CAN ADD TO THAT 
iTEVER WE NEED TO MAKE SURE THAT THEY — THE ISSUES BETWEEN 
AND BUTTERS ARE COVERED. 
WHAT WOULD YOU THINK OF THAT, DARIN? 
MR. HAMMOND: I THINK THAT'S WISE. I WOULD LIKE TO 
IDLE THIS RIGHT NOW SO THAT IT DOESN'T BECOME A PROBLEM IN 
FUTURE. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THEN WHY DON'T I HAVE ONE OF YOU 
?ARE THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS AND THROW IN SOME LEGAL 
SCRIPTIONS HERE THAT ARE GONNA ACCOMPLISH THAT? 
MR. MARTINEAU: I'LL BE HAPPY TO UNDERTAKE THAT. 
THE COURT: I ASSUME YOU'VE HAD SOME ACCURATE SURVEYS 
THAT DO LAY OUT THE METES AND BOUNDS. 
MR. MARTINEAU: YES, WE DO. WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO COME 
w 
ti THE COURT: I — I'M SAYING METES AND BOUNDS TO THE 
JDARIES BY ACQUIESCENCE BECAUSE I ASSUME THAT'S WHAT WE'D 
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BE TALKING ABOUT AT A TRIAL. 
MR. MARTINEAU: YES. I'D BE HAPPY TO COME UP WITH SOME 
,':'fROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IF YOUR HONOR WOULD LIKE ME 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: YOUR HONOR, WAS THERE — I ASSUME 
,T THERE'S NO TRIAL BRIEF DUE TOMORROW. 
1? THE COURT: THERE WON'T BE AS LONG AS — NO, THERE — 
IfSERE WON'T BE ANYTHING MORE NEEDED. 
MR. MARTINEAU: OKAY. NOW, WILL YOUR HONOR — WAS YOUR 
!OR GOING TO RULE FIRST OR SHOULD I JUST GO AHEAD AND 
SPARE THE FINDINGS AND WE'LL HAVE THOSE TAKE CARE OF IT? 
THE COURT: WELL, MY RULING GIVEN THE STIPULATION IS 
*READY ON THE RECORD. 
MR. MARTINEAU: OKAY. 
THE COURT: I DON'T THINK I NEED TO RULE FURTHER AS LONG 
?THAT STIPULATION'S ON THE RECORD. DO EITHER OF YOU — ANY 
ll'lfOU SEE A REASON WHY I WOULD NEED TO? 
MR. MARTINEAU: I DON'T. 
MR. WARNER: NO, I DON'T EITHER. I --
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: NO. 
MR. WARNER: I QUESTION THE NECESSITY OF BOTH THE 
«HGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS IN A FORMAL SORT OF WAY. IS 
IpiOERSTANDING, RULINGS ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
JUT — DON'T REQUIRE TECHNICAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND — 
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THE COURT: WELL, IT'S NOT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL, BUT 
JRE IT'S FINALIZING A CASE SUCH — WITH SUCH COMPLICATED 
ISSUES AS THIS, I WOULD REQUIRE IT. 
MR. WARNER: OKAY. 
MR. MARTINEAU: YEAH, WE THINK IT'S VERY MUCH IN ORDER. 
THE COURT: UH-HUH. 
MR. WARNER: THERE'S ONE OTHER ISSUE THAT I DON'T KNOW 
|F IT NEEDS TO BE BROUGHT UP. MR. MARTINEAU, THE DEPOSITION 
?TS OF OUR EXPERT, DID YOU GET HER BILL AND ARE YOU GOING 
TAKE CARE OF THAT OR DO WE NEED TO PROCEED — 
MR. MARTINEAU: I DID GET IT. I HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE TO 
!AY CONSIDER IT. I DON'T THINK THAT WE SHOULD BE LIABLE 
ISfCa WORK THAT SHE DID IN STUDYING TO GET READY. WE DIDN'T 
$&&K HER TO STUDY AND GET READY. WE JUST WANTED HER TO 
IFY TO THE FACTS THAT SHE'S AWARE OF. 
gjf, MR. WARNER: OKAY. WELL, IT'S PRETTY MODEST BILL. WHY 
•T YOU LOOK IT OVER AND IF THERE'S A PROBLEM, LET US KNOW. 
THE COURT: AND I'VE ALREADY ISSUED A RULING ON THE 
EXPERTS, HOW I WOULD ALLOW THAT, AND I THINK IT SHOULD 
RE, TOO. 
MR. MARTINEAU: THAT JOHN STALL? 
Ik- THE COURT: YEAH. 
MR. MARTINEAU: OKAY. THAT PROBABLY WILL OFFSET AT 
hSZ THE OTHER BILL THEN. OKAY. 
MR. WARNER: WHAT — IS THAT IN YOUR — IS THAT IN YOUR 
*BiG THAT YOU — 
PC THE COURT: NO. THAT WAS IN A EARLIER MOTION WHERE I 
IITED WHAT HE COULD CHARGE FOR. 
MR. WARNER: I'M NOT FAMILIAR WITH THAT. 
THE COURT: OH, RECALL HE WANTED TO CHARGE WHAT, $200 AN 
t- FOR ALL OF THE TIME THAT HE SPENT IN PREPARATION, AND I 
BED THAT? 
|5•' THE CLERK: WAS THAT IN THE OTHER CASE, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: NO, IT WAS IN THIS CASE. I BELIEVE. 
MR. WARNER: I THINK 
THE COURT: WASN'T IT WAS IT IN ANOTHER — I HAD 
'ALL IN ANOTHER CASE. 
MR. WARNER: I THINK IT MAY HAVE BEEN IN THE OTHER ~ 
fc THE COURT: OH, I'M SORRY. IT WAS. I DID NOT ALLOW HIM 
CHARGE ALL OF HIS PREPARATION TIME. I DID ALLOW HIM TO 
C^HARGE FOR THE ACTUAL DEPOSITION TIME. 
MR. MARTINEAU: OKAY. I'M NOT AWARE OF THAT. 
THE COURT: NO, AND I --I'M SORRY. THAT WAS ANOTHER 
'|IAND CASE THAT I HAD RECENTLY THAT --
^ MR. WARNER: SAME WITNESS. 
> 
'1' THE COURT: — I WAS CONFUSED ON. BUT HE WAS A WITNESS 
- JN THAT ONE AS WELL. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: WILL WE NEED TO COME TO THE FIRST 
i DAY OF THE TRIAL TO FINALIZE ANYTHING — 
THE COURT: NO. 
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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: ~ AND WILL THE OTHER DAY BE 
CANCELLED? 
THE COURT: IT'LL ALL BE CANCELLED. YOU WON'T EVEN NEED 
TO APPEAR. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: OKAY. 
MR. MARTINEAU: OKAY. 
THE COURT: UNLESS SOMEBODY SEES A NEED TO APPEAR. I 
DON'T. 
MR. MARTINEAU: YOUR HONOR, IN PREPARING THESE FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS, I WILL — WE'LL WANT TO GET A COPY OF THE — 
OF THIS HEARING SO THAT I CAN HAVE EXACTLY BEFORE ME WHAT 
YOUR HONOR'S RULED AND WHAT STIPULATIONS HAVE BEEN, SO 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I'LL ASK — I'LL DIRECT MY CLERK 
TO HAVE THE COURT REPORTER PREPARE A COPY OF THIS HEARING. 
MR. MARTINEAU: OH, BOY, THAT WOULD BE — 
THE COURT: THE TELEPHONE CONFERENCE. 
MR. MARTINEAU: AND THEN BRETT CRAGUN WHO'S IN MY OFFICE 
LIVES IN OGDEN. I'LL HAVE HIM PICK UP A COPY. ONCE WE GET 
THE COPY, WE'LL COME UP WITH SOME FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
WITHOUT DELAY. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND WE'LL CANCEL ALL HEARINGS 
THEN UNLESS SOMEBODY SEES A NEED FOR ONE. 
THE CLERK: WE'LL NEED A CHECK OR SOME TYPE OF PAYMENT 
FOR THAT COPY OF THE TAPE. 
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THE COURT: HOW MUCH I S THAT, $12 OR SOMETHING? 
THE CLERK: FIFTEEN — 1 5 . 
THE COURT: DIANE? 
THE CLERK: $ 1 5 . 
THE COURT: $ 1 5 . GET IT TO MY CLERK, DIANE, 
MARTINEAU. 
MR. MARTINEAU: OKAY. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. MARTINEAU: I UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU WAS GONNA HAVE A 
IANSCRIPT PREPARED THERE? 
THE COURT: NO. I T ' L L BE A VIDEOTAPE. 
MR. MARTINEAU: OKAY. 
THE COURT: THAT'S ALL YOU'LL NEED. 
MR. MARTINEAU: OKAY. WE'LL GET IT — WE'LL GET THE 
AYMENT AND WE'LL PICK UP IT UP AS SOON AS WE CAN. 
THE COURT: AND MY CLERK I S DIANE AT 3 9 5 - 1 1 5 6 . 
MR. MARTINEAU: OKAY. 
THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE WE NEED TO DISCUSS? 
MR. WARNER: THINK NOT. 
MR. MARTINEAU: THANKS, JUDGE. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: UH-HUH. 
-k * k k "k 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
H.C. MASSEY; and BETTY P. MASSEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KENNETH A. GRIFFITHS; BKB LLC; 
QUESTAR GAS COMPANY; WILSON 
IRRIGATION CO.; AARON B. BUTTARS; 
BRENDA L. BUTTARS; ADELE B. 
LEWIS; FRANCES E. HANKS; KIMEL P. 
FISHER; and JOHN DOES 1 through 100, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 960900027 • 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Law 
960900027 BKB LLC 
984 
12 X 12, L.L.C., a Limited Liability 
Company; 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
H.C. MASSEY; BETTY P. MASSEY; 
QUESTAR GAS COMPANY, a 
Corporation; AARON B. BUTTARS; 
BRENDA L. BUTTARS; and ADELE B. 
LEWIS, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
The above-entitled cause came on regularly before the Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
for a Final Pretrial Telephone Conference on February 24, 2004 at 8:30 a.m., the plaintiffs 
appearing by and through their counsel Frank S. Warner, the defendants Kenneth A. 
Griffiths and BKB LLC, and third-party plaintiff 12 X 12, L.L.C., appearing by and 
through their counsel Ray G. Martineau and Douglas L. Stowell, the defendants Aaron B. 
Buttars, Brenda L. Buttars and Adele B. Lewis appearing by and through their counsel M. 
Darin Hammond, and the Court having previously approved and signed its Order Of 
Dismissal As To The Defendant Wilson Irrigation Company Only, dated February 19, 
2003, and the Stipulation, Order, And Judgment Of Dismissal With Prejudice Of Plaintiffs' 
Claims Against Questar Gas Company, dated October 9, 2003, and the named defendants 
Frances E. Hanks and IGmel P. Fisher not having been served with process or having 
entered any appearance herein and the Court having heretofore issued its Ruling 
Conditionally Denying Summary Judgment, dated February 9, 2004, and the Court having 
heard and carefully considered the statements and arguments of counsel, including the 
statement by plaintiffs' counsel that plaintiffs "concede that the property in question that 
we claim under the tax deeds has historically been occupied by the defendants and their 
predecessors in interest, together with the Questar Gas property and their predecessors in 
interest • • • for at least 20 years," and that the "defendants and their predecessors in interest 
have paid taxes on the tax notices that were issued to them by the County", and the Court 
being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor hereby makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about September 10, 1993 Frances B. Hanks, as the then owner and 
holder of the record, legal and equitable title to the following described real property 
("Griffiths Property") located in Weber County, State of Utah, conveyed the same to the 
defendant Kenneth A. Griffiths ("Griffiths") by Warranty Deed dated September 10, 1993, 
which Warranty Deed was subsequently recorded in the office of the Weber County 
Recorder on September 23, 1993 in Book 1681 at Pages 1038 and 1039 as Entry No. 
1248223: 
15-063-0035 and 15-062-0036: Part of the Southeast Quarter of Section 24, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. 
Survey: Beginning at a point in the center of 1200 West Street, said point 
being West 942.09 feet and South 286.17 feet from the East Quarter Corner 
of said Section 24, and running thence South along said center 201.72 feet, 
thence West 863.79 feet to the East line of the Willard Canal right-of-way; 
thence Northwesterly along said East line along the arc of a 495 foot radius 
curve to the right a distance of 210.22 feet, the long chord of which bears 
North 15°20'47" West 209.21 feet; thence East 929.15 feet to the point of 
beginning. Excepting therefrom the Street on the East. 
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15-063-0037 and 15-063-0038: Part of the Southeast Quarter of Section 24, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. 
Survey: Beginning at a point in the center of 1200 West Street, said point 
being West 942.09 feet and South 487.89 feet from the East Quarter Corner 
of said Section 24, and running thence South along said center 157 feet; 
thence West along a fence 183 feet; thence South along a fence 40 feet; 
thence West along a fence 202 feet; thence South along a fence 289.80 feet 
in the East line of the Willard Canal right of way; thence Northwesterly 
along said East line as follows: North 45°01' West 559.61 feet to the point 
of a curve; thence along the arc of a 495 foot radius curve to the right a 
distance of 150.93 feet, the long chord of which bears North 36°16'53" 
West 150.35 feet; thence East 269.79 feet to the point of beginning. 
Excepting therefrom the street on the East. 
2. On or about January 24, 1994 Kenneth A. Griffiths, as the then owner and 
holder of the record, legal and equitable title to the Griffiths Property conveyed the same to 
the defendant BKB LLC, a Utah limited liability company ("BKB"), by Warranty Deed 
dated January 24, 1994, which Warranty Deed was subsequently recorded in the office of 
the Weber County Recorder on January 24, 1994 in Book 1699 at Pages 1947 and 1948 as 
Entry No. 1270446. 
3. On or about October 26, 2000 BKB LLC, as the then owner and holder of 
the record, legal and equitable title to the Griffiths Property conveyed the same to the third-
party plaintiff 12 X 12, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company ("12 X 12"), by Quit 
Claim Deed dated October 26, 2000, which Quit Claim Deed was recorded in the office of 
the Weber County Recorder on November 1, 2000 in Book 2099 at Pages 1904-1906 as 
Entry No. 1735201. 
4. 12 X 12 and each of its predecessors in interest in and to the Griffiths 
Property have timely paid and discharged all real property taxes that have been levied upon 
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the Griffiths Property during and throughout a period of more than 20 years immediately 
preceding the initiation of the above-entitled action. 
5. On or about February 26, 1953 Kenneth H. De Vries and Ruth Carver De 
Vries, as the then owners and holders of the record, legal and equitable title to the 
following described real property ("Buttars Property") located in Weber County, State of 
Utah, conveyed the same to James H. Lewis and the defendant Adele B. Lewis, as joint 
tenants, by Warranty Deed dated February 26, 1953, which Warranty Deed was 
subsequently recorded in the office of the Weber County Recorder on June 26, 1962 in 
Book 714 at Page 232 as Entry No. 382225: 
A part of the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 24; in 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West of the Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey, 
in Weber County, State of Utah; Beginning at a point 20 chains sough and 
14.58 chains west of the northeast corner of said quarter section; thence 
west 5.44 chains; thence north IVi chains; thence east 5.44 chains; thence 
south 7% chains to the place of beginning, containing AlA acres, more or 
less. 
6. On or about June 23, 1962 Wesley De Vries and Phyllis De Vries, executed 
and delivered a certain Quit Claim Deed covering the Buttars Property to James H. Lewis 
and the defendant Adele B. Lewis, as joint tenants, which Quit Claim Deed was 
subsequently recorded in the office of the Weber County Recorder on June 26, 1962 in 
Book 714 at Page 233 as Entry No. 382226. 
7. On or about December 5, 1994 the defendant Adele B. Lewis, as the then 
owner and holder of the record, legal and equitable title to the Buttars Property (her 
husband and joint tenant having theretofore died) conveyed the same to the defendants 
Aaron B. Buttars and Brenda L. Buttars ("the Buttars") by Warranty Deed dated December 
5 Q Q Q 
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;; 5, 1994, which Warranty Deed was subsequently recorded in the office of the Weber 
d» 
* County Recorder on December 5,1994 in Book 1740 at Page 912 as Entry No. 1324178. 
in 8. The Buttars and each of their predecessors in interest in and to the Buttars 
w 
Property have timely paid and discharged all real property taxes that have been levied upon 
the Buttars Property during and throughout a period of more than 20 years immediately 
preceding the initiation of the above-entitled action. 
9. The boundaries between the Griffiths Property, the Buttars Property and the 
Questar Gas property have been clearly marked and identified, as they are now, by long 
established fence lines, which fence lines have been recognized and acquiesced in by the 
respective owners of the Griffiths Property, the Buttars Property and the Questar Gas 
property as the actual boundaries between their respective properties, for a period of not 
less than twenty continuous years immediately preceding the initiation of the above-
entitled action. 
10. On or about June 12, 1986 Weber County, acting by and through the Weber 
County Auditor, executed and delivered to plaintiffs that certain Tax Deed ('Tax Deed No. 
1") purporting thereby to convey to plaintiffs the following described real property located 
in Weber County, State of Utah, which deed was subsequently recorded in the office of the 
Weber County Recorder on June 13, 1986 in Book A-8 at Page 397 as Entry No. 971917: 
PART OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 24, TOWNSHIP 
6 NORTH, RANGE 2 WEST, SALT LAKE BASE MERIDIAN, U.S. 
SURVEY: BEGINNING 20 CHAINS EAST, AND 737.89 FEET SOUTH 
OF THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF SAID QUARTER SECTION: 
RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 47.11 FEET: THENCE EAST 377 FEET 
MORE OR LESS TO A POINT WEST 942.09 FEET FROM THE EAST 
LINE OF SAID QUARTER SECTION: THENCE NORTH 47.11 FEET; 
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THENCE WEST 377. FEET, MORE OR LESS TO THE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
11. On or about June 12, 1986 Weber County, acting by and through the Weber 
County Auditor, executed and delivered to plaintiffs that certain Tax Deed ("Tax Deed No. 
2") purporting thereby to convey to plaintiffs the following described real property located 
in Weber County, State of Utah, which deed was subsequently recorded in the office of the 
Weber County Recorder on June 13,1986 in Book A-8 at Page 398 as Entry No. 97198: 
PART OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 24, TOWNSHIP 
6 NORTH, RANGE 2 WEST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, U.S. 
SURVEY: BEGINNING AT A POINT 1291.37 FEET WEST AND 
1040.37 FEET SOUTH OF THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SAID 
SECTION 24: THENCE NORTH 325.49 FEET; THENCE WEST 35.71 
FEET; THENCE SOUTH289.80 FEET: THENCE SOUTH 45D01' EAST 
50.49 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
12. On or about June 8, 1992 Weber County, acting by and through the Weber 
County Auditor, executed and delivered to plaintiffs that certain Tax Deed ("Tax Deed No. 
3") purporting thereby to convey to plaintiffs the following described real property located 
in Weber County, State of Utah, which deed was subsequently recorded in the office of the 
Weber County Recorder in Book 1629 at Page 700 as Entry No. 1181275: 
PART OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 24, TOWNSHIP 
6 NORTH, RANGE 2 WEST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, U.S. 
SURVEY: BEGINNING 20 CHAINS EAST AND 785 FEET SOUTH OF 
THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF SAID QUARTER SECTION, 
RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 40 FEET; THENCE EAST 176.04 FEET, 
THENCE NORTH 40 FEET, THENCE EAST 150 FEET, THENCE 
SOUTH 40 FEET, THENCE EAST TO A POINT WEST 942.09 FEET 
FROM THE EAST LINE OF SAID QUARTER SECTION, THENCE 
NORTH 40 FEET, THENCE WEST 377 FEET TO THE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
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13. On or about June 8, 1992 Weber County, acting by and through the Weber 
County Auditor, executed and delivered to plaintiffs that certain Tax Deed ("Tax Deed No. 
4") purporting thereby to convey to plaintiffs the following described real property located 
in Weber County, State of Utah, which deed was subsequently recorded in the office of the 
Weber County Recorder in Book 1629 at Page 702 as Entry No. 1181277: 
PART OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 24, TOWNSHIP 
6 NORTH, RANGE 2 WEST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN: BEGINNING 20 
CHAINS EAST 714.89 FEET SOUTH OF THE NORTHWEST CORNER 
OF SAID QUARTER SECTION; RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 23 FEET; 
THENCE EAST 377 FEET; THENCE NORTH 63 FEET; THENCE WEST 
183 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 40 FEET; THENCE WEST 194.91 FEET 
TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
14. A cursory inspection by the Weber County Assessor or the plaintiffs of the 
Griffiths Property, the Buttars Property and the Questar Gas property would readily and 
clearly have disclosed that the boundaries of and between the same were clearly marked 
and identified by long established fence lines and that the same had been occupied by the 
owners of said properties over an extended period of time. 
15. E. Paul Gilgen, a former Weber County Surveyor, prepared a survey of the 
real property, of which the Griffiths Property, the Buttars Property and the Questar Gas 
property are now a part, dated October 22, 1963, which survey accurately shows the 
location of the boundary lines as they now exist, between the Griffiths Property, the 
Buttars Property and the Questar Gas property. 
16. The root of the title to the legal descriptions that are set forth in Tax Deed 
No. 1, Tax Deed No. 2, Tax Deed No. 3 and Tax Deed No. 4 ('Tax Deeds") is a Quit 
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Claim Deed, dated September 25, 1979, that purports to convey the real property described 
therein, to which property the grantor named therein held no title or interest. 
17. None of the legal descriptions set forth in the Tax Deeds cover any real 
property that the defendants, 12 X 12, and their respective predecessors in interest have not 
occupied, possessed and paid taxes on as above stated for a continuous period of not less 
than 20 years immediately preceding the initiation of the above-entitled action. 
18. None of the legal descriptions that are set forth in the Tax Deeds cover any 
real property that the defendants and their predecessors in interest have not possessed, 
occupied and paid taxes on as above stated. 
From the foregoing Findings Of Fact, the Court now makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court's findings and ruling set forth in the Court's Ruling 
Conditionally Denying Summary Judgment, dated February 9, 2004 are by this reference 
incorporated herein and made a part hereof. 
2. The defendants Kenneth A. Griffiths, BKB LLC, Aaron B. Buttars, Brenda 
L. Buttars and Adele B. Lewis, and the third-party plaintiff 12X12, and each of them, are 
entitled to the entry of an order herein dismissing all of plaintiffs' claims herein with 
prejudice and upon the merits and awarding plaintiffs nothing thereby. 
3. The defendant 12 X 12, is entitled to the entry of an order herein quieting 
the title to the Griffiths Property, including all portions thereof heretofore occupied by the 
defendant 12 X 12 and its predecessors in interest up to and including the present 
boundaries thereof, in 12 X 12, free and clear of any and all claims, rights, titles, interests 
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and estates of every kind and description therein and thereto of plaintiffs and any other 
party hereto. 
4. The defendants Aaron B. Buttars, Brenda L. Buttars and Adele B. Lewis are 
entitled to the entry of judgment herein quieting the title to the Buttars Property, including 
any and all portions thereof heretofore occupied by the Buttars and their predecessors in 
interest, in the Buttars, free and clear of any and all claims, rights, titles, interests and 
estates of every kind and description therein and thereto of plaintiffs and any other party 
hereto. 
5. Tax Deed No. 1, Tax Deed No. 2, Tax Deed No. 3 and Tax Deed No. 4 are 
invalid and of no force and effect as such relate to the parties in this action. 
6. The defendants and 12 X 12 are entitled to be awarded their respective costs 
of court and disbursements pursuant to the provisions of Rule 54(d), URCP. 
DATED this j Z ^ d a y of April/2004. 
Roger S. 
District Court Judge 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed Findings Of 
Fact And Conclusions Of Law was served upon the following individuals, and by mailing 
a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to each of said individuals at the addresses shown below, 
this _ ^ 2 day of April, 2004. 
10 993 
Frank S. Warner 
3564 Lincoln Ave, Suite 6 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Abigail L. Jones 
180 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Perrin R. Love 
Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
M. Darin Hammond 
Smith Knowles & Hamilton PC 
4723 Harrison Blvd, Suite 200 
Ogden,UT 84403 
— — + • * 
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Ray G. Martineau (#2105) 
Anthony R. Martineau (#5859) 
Brett D. Cragun (#8683) 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone (801) 486-0200 
Facsimile (801) 486-0383 
Douglas L. Stowell (#6659) 
STOWELL & ASSOCIATES 
307 East Stanton Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 944-3459 
Facsimile (801) 483-0705 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Kenneth A. Griffiths, BKB, LLC and 12 X 12, L.L.C. 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
H.C. MASSEY; and BETTY P. MASSEY, ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
KENNETH A. GRIFFITHS; BKB LLC; ; 
QUESTAR GAS COMPANY; WILSON ; 
IRRIGATION CO.; AARON B. BUTTARS;; 
BRENDA L. BUTTARS; ADELE B. ; 
LEWIS; FRANCES E. HANKS; KTMEL P. ; 
FISHER; and JOHN DOES 1 through 100, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) ORDER QUIETING TITLE TO REAL 
) PROPERTY IN 12 X 12, L.L.C. AND 
) IN AARON B. BUTTARS AND 
) BRENDA L. BUTTARS 
' MAY 2 1 2 0 0 4 
) Civil No. 960900027 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
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12 X 12, L.L.C., a Limited Liability 
Company; 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
H.C. MASSEY; BETTY P. MASSEY; 
QUESTAR GAS COMPANY, a 
Corporation; AARON B. BUTTARS; 
BRENDA L. BUTTARS; and ADELE B. 
LEWIS, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
The above-entitled cause came on regularly before the Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
for a Final Pretrial Telephone Conference on February 24, 2004 at 8:30 a.m., the plaintiffs 
appearing by and through their counsel Frank S. Warner, the defendants Kenneth A. 
Griffiths and BKB LLC, and third-party plaintiff 12 X 12, L.L.C., appearing by and 
through their counsel Ray G. Martineau and Douglas L. Stowell, the defendants Aaron B. 
Buttars, Brenda L. Buttars and Adele B. Lewis appearing by and through their counsel M. 
Darin Hammond, and the Court having previously approved and signed its Order Of 
Dismissal As To The Defendant Wilson Irrigation Company Only, dated February 19, 
2003, and the Stipulation, Order, And Judgment Of Dismissal With Prejudice Of Plaintiffs' 
Claims Against Questar Gas Company, dated October 9, 2003, and the named defendants 
Frances E. Hanks and Kimel P. Fisher not having been served with process or having 
entered any appearance herein, and the Court having heretofore issued its Ruling 
Conditionally Denying Summary Judgment, dated February 9, 2004, and the Court having 
c 3 
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heard and carefully considered the statements and arguments of counsel, including the 
statement by plaintiffs' counsel that plaintiffs "concede that the property in question that 
we claim under the tax deeds has historically been occupied by the defendants and their 
predecessors in interest, together with the Questar Gas property and their predecessors in 
interest • • • for at least 20 years," and that the "defendants and their predecessors in interest 
have paid taxes on the tax notices that were issued to them by the County", and the Court 
having heretofore made and entered its Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law and 
being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor hereby makes and 
enters the following judgment: 
1. Plaintiffs' Complaint and Amended Complaint, and all of plaintiffs' claims 
related thereto, should be and the same are hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon the 
merits. 
2. The fee simple title to the following described real property located in 
Weber County, State of Utah should be and the same is hereby quieted in third-party 
plaintiff 12 X 12, L.L.C. against and free and clear of any and all claims of every kind and 
nature therein or thereto of the plaintiffs, or either of them, or of any other party hereto, 
including any and all such claims based upon the legal doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence: 
15-063-0035 and 15-062-0036: Part of the Southeast Quarter of Section 24, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. 
Survey: Beginning at a point in the center of 1200 West Street, said point 
being West 942.09 feet and South 286.17 feet from the East Quarter Corner 
of said Section 24, and running thence South along said center 201.72 feet, 
thence West 863.79 feet to the East line of the Willard Canal right-of-way; 
thence Northwesterly along said East line along the arc of a 495 foot radius 
curve to the right a distance of 210.22 feet, the long chord of which bears 
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North 15°20'47" West 209.21 feet; thence East 929.15 feet to the point of 
beginning. Excepting therefrom the Street on the East. 
15-063-0037 and 15-063-0038: Part of the Southeast Quarter of Section 24, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. 
Survey: Beginning at a point in the center of 1200 West Street, said point 
being West 942.09 feet and South 487.89 feet from the East Quarter Corner 
of said Section 24, and running thence South along said center 157 feet; 
thence West along a fence 183 feet; thence South along a fence 40 feet; 
thence West along a fence 202 feet; thence South along a fence 289.80 feet 
in the East line of the Willard Canal right of way; thence Northwesterly 
along said East line as follows: North 45°0r West 559.61 feet to the point 
of a curve; thence along the arc of a 495 foot radius curve to the right a 
distance of 150.93 feet, the long chord of which bears North 36°16'53" 
West 150.35 feet; thence East 269.79 feet to the point of beginning. 
Excepting therefrom the street on the East. 
3. The fee simple title to the following described real property located in 
Weber County, State of Utah should be and the same is hereby quieted in the defendants 
Aaron B. Buttars and Brenda L. Buttars against and free and clear of any and all claims of 
every kind and nature therein or thereto of the plaintiffs, or either of them, or of any other 
party hereto, including any and all such claims based upon the legal doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence: 
A part of the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 24; in 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West of the Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey, 
in Weber County, State of Utah; Beginning at a point 20 chains sough and 
14.58 chains west of the northeast corner of said quarter section; thence 
west 5.44 chains; thence north llA chains; thence east 5.44 chains; thence 
south IV* chains to the place of beginning, containing 4J4 acres, more or 
less. 
4. Tax Deed No. 1, Tax Deed No. 2, Tax Deed No. 3 and Tax Deed No. 4 are 
hereby decreed invalid and of no force and effect as such relate to the parties in this action. 
5. Each of the parties hereto should be and are hereby ordered to bear and pay 
such party's costs and attorney's fees incurred herein. 
4 
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DATED this <££>day of Aprii^2004. 
^U^J^AJ 
Roger Sj/Dutson 
District Court Judge 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Quieting Title 
To Real Property In 12 X 12, L.L.C. And In Aaron B. Buttars And Brenda L. Buttars was 
served upon the following individuals, and by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to 
each of said individuals at the addresses shown below, this 2 *7day of April, 2004. 
Frank S. Warner 
3564 Lincoln Ave, Suite 6 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Abigail L. Jones 
180 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Perrin R. Love 
Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
M. Darin Hammond 
Smith Knowles & Hamilton PC 
4723 Harrison Blvd, Suite 200 
Ogden,UT 84403 
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